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BOOK REVIEW
Powers and Capacities in Philosophy: The New Aristotelianism. By Ruth Groff and
John Greco. (New York and London: Routledge, 2013. Pp. 360. Price £80.00
hardback.)
Metaphysical accounts of fundamental properties may be divided into two
camps. The ‘Humean’ view holds that all fundamental properties are categor-
ical properties (purely qualitative properties which possess no essential disposi-
tional character). All dispositional properties are non-fundamental properties
grounded in categorical properties (and the laws of nature). In contrast, the
‘Aristotelian’ view (often called ‘dispositional essentialism’ or ‘power-ontology’)
holds that (at least some of) the fundamental metaphysical properties are essen-
tially dispositional. The present volume is motivated by the thought that the
recent resurgence of the latter view inmetaphysics will challenge long-standing
Humean assumptions in other areas. It aims to provide ‘a composite portrait of
a neo-Aristotelian, powers-based approach to issues in contemporary analytic
philosophy’ (p. 1), and offers seventeen original essays to this end.
Part I, ‘Metaphysics’ (four papers), opens with a piece by StephenMumford
describing how his own thinking about powers developed over time. Next,
Alexander Bird provides a cautionary note against overenthusiastic estimations
of the significance of dispositional essentialism for other fields and argues
that the success of dispositional accounts in other areas has no direct bearing
on whether the fundamental properties are categorical properties. Eleonore
Stump compares a fairly typical modern account of emergent causal properties
with the account of Aquinas (for whom causal power depends upon functional
organization) and Lynn Joy argues that Hume is not so ‘Humean’.
Part II, ‘Philosophy of Science’ (three papers), begins with a paper by Nancy
Cartwright and John Pemberton. They suppose that powers make stable ‘con-
tributions’ across different circumstances (rather than having different mani-
festation types depending upon their mutual manifestation partners) and argue
that taking powers to be fundamental properties makes good sense of scientific
practice. Next, Anjan Chakravartty proposes that a powers-based approach
combines the pay-off of both entity realism (the view that the entities described
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in science exist) and structural realism (the view that scientific theories accu-
rately describe the relations between entities). Finally, Rom Harre´ offers a
sketch of agentive concepts as they appear in social and natural sciences.
In Part III, ‘Mind and Agency’ (four papers), William Jaworski defends a
hylomorphic account of mind against criticisms of emergence (his account
of emergence differs markedly from Broadian emergentism) and charges of
causal overdetermination (his account embraces ‘causal pluralism’). Jonathan
Lowe argues that the human will is a two-way power [‘a power to will or not
to will to do such-and-such’ (p. 172)], the exercise of which is typically guided by
reason and the manifestations of which (volitions to ϕ) are not caused by prior
events or ‘outside forces’ (it requires no stimulus). Brian Ellis describes so-called
‘social agency realism’ (a view that the causal powers of human individuals are
heavily influenced by their societies) and discusses its underlying metaphysics.
Finally, Ruth Groff aims to clarify the nature of the disagreement between
Bird and some other power-ontologists (such as Mumford). Bird characterizes
power-ontologymuch as I have above butGroff sees this as a poorman’s power-
ontology as it fails to attribute to powers the ‘dynamism’, ‘active nature’, etc.
that they deserve. This, Groff claims, is why Bird fails to see the implications
of power-ontology beyond fundamental metaphysics.
In Part IV, ‘Ethics and Epistemology’ (three papers), Rani Lill Anjum, Svein
Anders Noer Lie, and StephenMumford jointly examine dispositional notions
in ethics; Jesper Kallestrup and Duncan Pritchard offer a paper on the ad-
vantages and limitations of virtue epistemology; and Linda Zagzebski argues
that reasons for belief derive from reflective use of epistemic powers. In Part V,
‘Social and Political Philosophy’ (three papers), Tony Lawson examines emer-
gent social causal powers; Charlotte Witt contrasts Lockean and Aristotelian
approaches to gender essentialism; and Kelvin Knight compares Searle and
MacIntyre on social rules and power.
Each paper discusses interesting material. Jointly they cover an impressively
wide range of topics and several make substantial contributions (to my mind,
the papers by Bird, Jaworski, and Lowe stand out). However, this volume claims
to offer a ‘portrait’ of a putatively novel approach and this reader has several
concerns about the coherence of the approach (and, indeed, the volume) which
deserve mention.
First, this volume assumes that dispositional essentialism will have impli-
cations in fields beyond fundamental metaphysics. However, only the papers
by Bird and Groff directly address the plausibility of this assumption. To my
mind, they form the core of this volume and both deserve careful reading,
but since Bird offers strong reasons to reject the assumption upon which the
volume is premised, further discussion on this topic is merited and would have
been welcome here.
Secondly, it is not entirely clear to this reader exactly what the ‘neo-
Aristotelian, powers-based approach’ that binds the volume together is







(a longer introduction might have helped). It seems that its defining slogan
is or involves ‘taking dispositions seriously’ (pp. 49, 105, 119, 128, 148, etc.),
but such talk is too vague. If taking dispositions seriously requires dispositional
essentialism, then around half of the papers fail to explicitly take dispositions
seriously. Often, even positions which fit the ‘neo-Aristotelian’ label well, such
as Jaworski’s interesting hylomorphic account, neither require nor are required
by dispositional essentialism.
If a more relaxed account of ‘taking dispositions seriously’ is given, then
problems still remain. Some papers would struggle to meet even a very gen-
erous interpretation of ‘taking dispositions seriously’. For instance, Kallestrup
and Pritchard offer a well-argued paper but do not discuss powers in any
detail and simply go along with the assumption—common among virtue
epistemologists—that dispositions are ‘causally inefficacious’ (p. 250). Further,
a more relaxed account threatens the coherence of the approach and it is not
clear that it offers ‘an alternative to entrenched neo-Humean positions’ (as the
back cover promises). Humeans deny only the fundamentality of dispositions.
Neither their hatred of dispositions nor their reductive zeal seems so great that
they are precluded from employing dispositions in their philosophical analyses
(and much of this volume would fail to offend Humean sensibilities).
Thirdly, Groff warns that ‘language can be deceptive’ (pp. 223 and 224)
but crucial theses and arguments often require clearer and more precise ar-
ticulation. For instance, if the so-called ‘active’ nature of powers (which Groff
and others discuss) is to be more than metaphorical, then it requires greater
elucidation. Equally, despite its precedent in the powers literature, the use of
‘real’—when ‘irreducible’ or ‘fundamental’ should be used—is slightly mis-
leading (one may suppose that some properties are real but not fundamental).
Last, given the importance of fundamentality and grounding to the relevant
debates, it is striking that, beyond some brief remarks by Bird, we find no
detailed discussion of either in this volume.
In sum, there is interesting material here but it is not always clear how
it all fits together, and the ‘portrait of [. . . ] [the] powers-based approach’
(p. 1) offered is somewhat fuzzy. However, the introduction notes that ‘the
new Aristotelianism is a rubric for an emerging research agenda [. . . ] [which]
is in its early days still’ (p. 1), and this volume does succeed in effectively
communicating the enthusiasm and ambition of said agenda in an accessible
manner. Looking to the future, those keen on identifying with this approach
may wish to address some of the issues mentioned above. In the meantime,
these dynamic essays provide food for thought for those pondering the potential
of the ‘powers-based approach’.
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